98th Congress
1st Session

COMMITTEE PRINT

S. PRT. 98-60

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION: PROSPECTS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP

A STAFF REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

JUNE 1983

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

21-317 O

WASHINGTON : 1983

53822-22

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INTRODUCTION

This year marks the fiftieth year of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. For sixteen years after the Communist revolution of 1917, the United States refused to recognize the Soviet regime, dealing with it only indirectly and suspiciously, and making no effort to resolve the issues separating the two governments.

In November 1933, however, the new administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to reverse this earlier aloofness, and the two governments entered into diplomatic relations. Ambassador William C. Bullitt was dispatched to Moscow at the end of the year, taking with him as interpreter a young Foreign Service officer named George F. Kennan, who was later to become one of the most perceptive and influential American advisors on United States-Soviet relations, as well as U.S. Ambassador to Moscow in his own right.

Kennan later wrote of the American decision:

> It might have been better if it had come with less exalted hopes and calculations as to its effects. But it was perhaps inevitable that a country which had so long exaggerated the effects of withholding recognition should exaggerate the significance of granting it.

The course of United States-Soviet relations since that time has followed a similarly rocky course of periodic "exalted hopes" followed by deep disappointments. The most recent episode in this cyclical history of United States-Soviet relations was the 1969–79 decade of détente, followed by the present period of deeply strained relations dating from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and reinforced by events in Poland.

Since both Russians and Americans are notably conscious of anniversaries, this fifty-year benchmark might ordinarily receive more attention than it has. However, it comes at a time when the Soviets are taking every opportunity to suggest that the relationship is at an historic low point. Americans would certainly also question whether this particular anniversary is any cause for celebration.

At the same time, Americans and many Russians realize that in the nuclear age the fate of the entire world hangs in the balance of the United States-Soviet relationship. It is that fact, rather than the happenstance of a fifty-year interlude, which prompts the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to initiate a series of hearings exploring the prospects for Soviet-American relations in the next decade. The purpose of these hearings is not to arrive at any particular set of conclusions or recommendations for U.S. policy, but rather to consider a range of possibilities and alternatives which may confront the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1980's

and beyond. During the course of the year, the Committee will hear from a number of Americans with direct experience or specialized training in United States-Soviet affairs.

Public understanding of these issues would not be well-served by any effort to reduce U.S. policy to a few glib generalities. But it may be useful to begin such an inquiry with a general survey of the present state of United States-Soviet relations and to offer a few tentative conclusions or hypotheses for further consideration.

That is the purpose of the following report compiled by five senior staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It draws upon a series of interviews conducted by the staff in Moscow during March of this year, which included not only a number of Soviet officials, journalists, and analysts, but also a wide assortment of Western and other non-Soviet diplomats and experts. The views expressed are, of course, the views of the staff members themselves, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Reagan administration or of any member of the Committee. The following staff members participated in the preparation of this report: Edward Sanders, Staff Director; Hans Binnendijk, Deputy Staff Director; Diana Smith, the Majority Staff's senior Soviet and European specialist; Carl Ford, a foreign policy specialist for the Minority Staff; and Frederick S. Tipson, the Committee's Chief Counsel.

Whether or not one agrees with all of the conclusions reached in this report, it should provide a useful starting point for the Committee's hearings and a basis for developing lines of inquiry with the public witnesses. I recommend it highly to the members of the Committee and to the public at large.

CHARLES H. PERCY, *Chairman.*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In preparation for hearings on United States-Soviet relations, five staff members of the Foreign Relations Committee spent the last week of March in the U.S.S.R. The purpose of the trip was to gain a better understanding of the Soviet view of the relationship and to determine the prospects for changes in the relationship in the 1980's. Staff members also discussed arms control prospects in Bonn and with the negotiators in Geneva and Vienna. The key conclusions of the study are the following:

General

● United States-Soviet relations have clearly continued to deteriorate over the last 3 years following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and repression in Poland. The future evolution of the relationship will depend to a large extent on whether agreements can be reached on limiting nuclear weapons.

● The timing of the trip—shortly after the President's speeches in Miami on the evil nature of the U.S.S.R. and in Washington on space-based missile defense—highlighted Soviet sensitivities. While it is not always possible to discern what is said for effect and what is genuinely believed, virtually all the Soviets we met with complained bitterly that the belligerent, crusading tone of the Administration was raising the danger of superpower confrontation and an escalating arms race.

● The Soviets do not recognize the linkage between their vigorous military buildup and intervention in various parts of the world on the one hand and the Reagan Administration's efforts to upgrade American military capabilities on the other hand.

● The difficulties in improving the bilateral relationship are compounded by the fact that the two countries have quite different agendas in dealing with each other. The Soviets want arms control agreements and trade without strings; they reject the United States belief that human rights or disputes over Soviet actions in other regions (Afghanistan, Poland, the Caribbean) are appropriate issues between major powers. Conversely, the United States has consistently taken the position that arms control and trade policy cannot be considered independently from the degree of Soviet internal repression and external aggression.

Arms Control

● The United States and Soviet differences in the INF talks are fundamental. To avoid any sign that progress is being made, Soviet negotiations were reportedly "belligerent" and "nasty as hell" during the last negotiating round. It is unlikely that an INF agreement will be produced prior to the December 1983 missile deployment date. As European public demonstrations increase in intensity during the year, the West German and other European govern-

ments may begin to press the United States for additional modifications to the current U.S. proposal.

● The deployment in Europe of Pershing II and cruise missiles is likely to take place, but it will generate a harsh Soviet reaction. It appears unlikely, however, that the Soviets will deploy land-based nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere in response.

● Both sides lost an important opportunity for a mutually beneficial INF agreement when they rejected the informal proposal put forward in 1982 by negotiators Nitze and Kvitsinsky. Perhaps the best chance for agreement remains something along the lines of that proposal.

● Prospects for agreement in the START talks are worse than for the INF talks. One senior U.S. START negotiator summarized the situation by saying that "we are playing in different ball parks." He concluded that "if the Administration wants an agreement during its first 4 years in office, it will have to move fast and make dramatic changes."

● After disclosure of the so-called Rowny memorandum, Ambassador Rowny's subordinates maintained their professionalism and tried not to allow the incident to interfere with the immediate business at hand. Behind the scenes, however, morale on the START team has deteriorated to the point where its future effectiveness could be seriously impaired.

● The only prospect for movement in START appears to be modification in the U.S. position as outlined by the Scowcroft Commission combined with Soviet modifications based on an acceptance of the Administration's determination to proceed with strategic modernization.

● The prospects for Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks are somewhat better. Serious probing of the East's intentions is called for in the June round of talks.

● Perhaps the most disturbing finding of the trip is the extent to which the current arms control impasse has led to a deterioration in the bilateral relationship. The Soviets describe the overall state of bilateral relations using terms such as "a critical situation," "pushing us to the brink," "a highly dangerous path," and "extreme pessimism."

Foreign Policy

● American thinking about the Soviet Union occasionally lapses into extreme views ranging from an assumption that both countries share the same fears, values, and problems, to an assumption that the Soviet Union typifies the antithesis of American values. The Soviet Union is a more complex society and a more complicated participant in world affairs than extreme views would allow.

● The United States has only a marginal ability to affect Soviet decisions by means of rewards and punishments. The factors which determine Soviet strategies and priorities are only partially related to external developments. Soviet military spending, for example, is based on a range of considerations in addition to its perception of external dangers at any given time.

● Events in Poland have posed probably the greatest threat to the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe since the war. Solidarity's challenge is that of a genuine worker's revolt in a system which purports to govern in the name of the worker. The ability of the

United States or other Western countries to affect events in Poland will probably continue to be slight for the foreseeable future.

● Soviet officials acknowledge that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was, in the short run, a major shift in the regional correlation of forces against them. They argue that in the long run, however, the invasion will prove to be a strategic setback for the United States because the United States is now "inextricably implicated" in the policies of the Israeli Government. The Soviet presence at SAM 5 sites in Syria raises the prospect for serious confrontation in the Middle East.

● The Soviets clearly intend to try to isolate the United States on the Namibian problem and the issue of Cuban troops in Angola. They intend to seek to use the delay in reaching a settlement to highlight the U.S. association with South Africa.

● In other areas of the world, Soviet officials denied the existence of Soviet policies despite the fact that they are well documented in the West. For example, they deny any involvement in the Salvadoran insurgency, they scoff at allegations that they use poison gas or biological toxin agents in Indochina and Afghanistan, and they say they are not seeking to gain advantage in United States-Soviet relations by "playing a China card."

East-West Trade

● The economic sanctions imposed because of Afghanistan and Poland have had a devastating effect on America's reputation as a reliable supplier. If disputes over East-West trade policy (resulting from these sanctions) continue among the allies, they will have a corrosive effect on the ability of the West to deal with other crucial issues of defense posture, arms control, and Soviet intentions elsewhere in the world.

● Trade between the Soviet Union and the West increased an unprecedented tenfold in the decade of the 1970's. The prospects for continued growth in the decade of the 1980's are much bleaker. The United States share of Soviet trade will probably decline as the United States becomes more of a supplier of last resort, and the Soviets diversify sources and as other countries try to bring their trade accounts into better balance with the Soviets.

Soviet Domestic Politics

● Although Andropov appears clearly in charge and able to speak for the Soviet Communist Party, he probably does so at this stage on the basis of a fairly fragile leadership consensus. If Andropov wants to make any significant policy departures, he must first be politically strong enough to overcome the tenacious resistance of a hierarchy whose positions and privileges are based on the status quo.

● The urgent Soviet priority is the economy. It is too early to tell what the Andropov leadership's economic policy will be. So far, Andropov seems to be buying time by focusing on worker discipline and political corruption.

● The current human rights situation in the Soviet Union is grim and getting worse. A renewed across-the-board crackdown began in 1979 and intensified in 1982. This attitude extends even to cases of 14 individuals who have U.S. citizenship by right of birth, whom the Soviets refuse to allow to leave.

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PART I: SOVIET DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS

A. The Soviet View of Relations With the United States

The "official" Soviet view of the current United States-U.S.S.R. relationship was evident in nearly all of the staff's interviews in Moscow. They argue that relations are at a very low point with little short-term prospect of improvement on any front. The Soviets place the blame for this "critical situation" entirely on the United States. They claim that the U.S. Government has assumed—without provocation—a posture of belligerent hostility and has set itself in pursuit of military superiority and international intimidation. President Reagan's two major speeches in March, one emphasizing the moral depravity of the Soviet system and the other looking toward the prospect of strategic defense, were cited as conclusive confirmation of these aggressive attitudes and intentions.

It is unclear to what degree the Soviet leadership actually believes that no progress is possible for the foreseeable future, and how much their purpose is simply to exploit the short-term political advantages in alarming Western opinion. The Soviets interviewed were obviously troubled by the Reagan Administration, and by the prospect that President Reagan might be reelected in 1984. Yet most of them also seem to date the beginning of the decline in relations from the time of the Carter Administration.

The Soviets simply denied the possibility that the deteriorating relationship was caused by a succession of Soviet activities in Africa, Afghanistan and Poland, as well as by the alarming deployment of SS–20 missiles in Europe.

Furthermore, all suggestions that relations might improve through the gradual expansion of cooperative efforts in less vital or visible areas of the world, or through gestures of flexibility and compromise by the Soviet Government, were rejected out of hand as calls for unilateral concessions from the U.S.S.R. With few exceptions, even Soviets outside the mainstream of policy-making were unwilling to speculate how the Soviet Union could initiate improvements in its relations with the United States. The Soviets clearly want it understood that they consider all the moves to be on the American side of the board.

The Soviets argue that they have taken every possible opportunity to normalize and regularize relations with the United States but have received no indication that real improvements are possible. They say that their Washington embassy experiences problems in gaining access to American officials, even though the reverse is not true for American diplomats in Moscow. Periodic discussions between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the American Secretary of

State have nevertheless continued and provide an available channel for effective discussions.

The Soviets suggest that their actions in Poland, Afghanistan and Cuba pose no threat to the interests of the United States. Their security requirements are simply different from those of the United States, they maintain. Soviet forces are not all directed at the United States; therefore, the military balance should be understood on a worldwide basis, not simply a United States-Soviet comparison. They insist that parity, not superiority, must be the criterion for force levels, and maintain that a rough parity exists today. In the long run, they argue, stability cannot be maintained without parity.

Soviet officials say they have the impression that the United States now considers détente to have been a mistake or an "accident of history," while to them it seems that there is no reasonable alternative.

B. General Features of Soviet Foreign Policy

In evaluating the current posture of the Soviet Government and the prospects for the future of the United States-U.S.S.R. relationship, several features of Soviet foreign policy stand out.

Patriotic Pride

Measured since 1945 in terms of a steady rise in material standards of living and massive increases in military capabilities, the Soviet people have much to be proud of, particularly in view of the enormous obstacles presented by the system in which they work. The same tenacity and crude ingenuity which account for these successes have also characterized past Soviet diplomatic campaigns, though often with far less satisfying results. Yet the familiar heavyhandednesses of past Soviet diplomacy and propaganda seemed to ease noticeably during the two decades of Leonid Brezhnev's control and may take a significant further step with the ascendency of Yuriy Andropov. Notwithstanding the counterproductive excesses of Soviet efforts during the final stages of the West German election campaign this year, the Soviet Union has become a more sophisticated and formidable adversary than in the day when Nikita Khrushchev pounded his shoe on the podium.

Righteous Bravado

The public posture of Soviet leaders and spokesmen, taken at face value, is one of righteous self-confidence, qualified only by expressions of concern for American excesses and irrationality. Soviet officials, journalists, and analysts do not readily admit to foreigners their anxieties about the dangers of domestic economic stagnation, American technological advances, or the unintended escalation of local crises, even though such dangers undoubtedly preoccupy Soviet foreign policy planners. Buttressed by an ideology which justifies a constant probing for political and military vulnerabilities in the outside world, and which assumes the irresistible growth of Soviet influence, the leadership seems able to rationalize all of its diplomatic and military activities as well-intentioned, even generous, steps in the advancement of peace and justice.

Exceptional Isolation

A visit to Moscow, and conversations there with Western specialists as well as Soviet officials, reinforces the impression that the Soviet leadership remains unusually isolated and parochial—only partially and selectively exposed to the facts, moods and opinions beyond their borders which might otherwise call into question the views reflected in Soviet propaganda. Despite the recent emphasis in Western media on the worldly-wise sophistication of the U.S.S.R.'s latest head man, Andropov, it appears that all Soviet leaders continue to live behind an ideological and empirical filter which reinforces their image of internal progress and external righteousness.

Militarism

The reliance on force and the accumulation of military power originates deep in Russian history and did not begin with the Bolshevik revolution. As Soviet analyst Dimitri Simes has written, "in the Soviet Union militarism begins at home. It is rooted in the Russian historical tradition, in the very structure of Soviet society and politics today, as well as in the interests and the mind set of the ruling elite." Fear of invasion from both East and West was a virtually constant theme in the Russian experience, and one which partially accounts for the counter-tendency of Russian expansionism (though the latter is less well remembered). Yet the broad popular response to warnings of Western hostility also has its modern source in the experience of the Second World War. "The Great Patriotic War" of 1941–45 remains an ever-present, energizing reality for all Soviet citizens, not only because the immense scale of Soviet losses left few families untouched, but also because the theme of heroic sacrifice and patriotic vigilance has ever since been a major political technique for motivating popular effort and support.

Especially vivid in their collective consciousness is the fact that the Nazi invasion was a surprise attack. The element of surprise and the fact of Soviet unpreparedness accounted for the deep penetration of German troops into the heart of the country and the consequent enormity of human and material losses—an estimated 20 million people lost during that war. Soviet officials sometimes explain their need for massive local advantages in firepower as compensation for the potential disadvantages from surprise attack. Likewise, they seem to justify their continued domination of Eastern Europe as somehow legitimized by the scale of their own suffering during the war, an experience which gives them an historic "right" to ensure against future recurrences.

Tactical Opportunism

What is not evident, however, either from the recent course of Soviet behavior or from the published or personal statements of Soviet officials and analysts, is that Soviet foreign policy is guided in detail by a grand design or strategic plan. Certainly such a specific program is not apparent from the ad hoc ideological precepts of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism-Brezhnevism which permeate official pronouncements.

Marxist ideology is clearly applied to the interests of the Russian state and not the reverse. Truth itself is relative to the interests of the regime. As George Kennan wrote years ago, "the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and reformed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendentiously to bolster an outlook already preconceived."

In the final analysis, it may make little practical difference for American policy whether Soviet foreign policy is fundamentally defensive or offensive. Even if the primary motivation of the Soviet leadership in developing its military capabilities is not to threaten and coerce other governments, there is little evidence to suggest that they would not do so whenever and wherever the opportunities arise, so long as the risk of provoking a larger confrontation or a disproportionate reaction from the rest of the world is not substantial. Restraint in the use of available force is a tactical consideration rather then an underlying value. One American expert characterizes this as "the offensive essence of Soviet defense concerns." It makes especially difficult any effort to convince the Soviets to accept a formalized code of restraints in their foreign policy behavior. The attempt to do so during the early 1970's and the frustration and resentment which resulted from subsequent Soviet behavior contributed substantially to the American disillusionment with détente.

C. Pitfalls for American Policy

This brief catalogue of Soviet foreign policy traits suggest the need to rethink a few assumptions that recur in American thinking about United States-U.S.S.R. relations.

Mirror Images and Double Standards

American thinking about the Soviet Union occasionally lapses into one of two extremes. On the one hand, there are Americans who tend to view the Soviets mainly in terms of the commonality of interests the two sides have as nuclear-armed superpowers. This view assumes that the Soviets must have the same fears, values and priorities as are held by Americans. Yet whatever similarities there may be between the two superpowers, the Soviet system and the traditions of Russian history and culture do result in a style and substance that is often starkly different from that of the United States. Ascribing American motives to Soviet leaders risks not only serious misunderstanding but also profound disillusionment.

On the other hand, there is the contrary tendency to view the Soviet Union as not just different, but *opposite* to the United States, and to regard every aspect and activity of the Soviet Union as typifying the antithesis of American values. From this perspective, the Soviets are incapable of constructive behavior or positive initiatives; every activity must be assumed to have a sinister explanation. Such an attitude denies the possibility of Soviet moderation and encourages the Soviet leadership to discount the advantages of restraint.

The Soviet Union is a more complex society and a more complicated participant in world affairs than either extreme view would allow. Our policy toward them should recognize and take advantage of these complexities.

American Influence on Soviet Policy

The United States has only a marginal ability to affect Soviet decisions by means of rewards and punishments. The factors which determine Soviet strategies and priorities are only partially related to external developments. Soviet military spending, for example, is based on a range of considerations in addition to its perception of the external dangers at any given time. Bureaucratic politics, leadership struggles, and resource priorities all may have as much to do with such choices as developments in the outside world.

The opportunities for Soviet mischief and adventurism in the outside world are created largely by local developments over which the United States has little control. Our need to counter such activities once they are initiated may be considerable, but the historical record of our successes is mixed.

Finally, the United States has less and less ability to control the environment in which the Soviets act because it has only limited influence over the behavior of other countries toward the Soviet Union. Not even our closest allies can be expected always to follow the United States lead in executing a strategy of pressures or inducements. Unilateral U.S. initiatives to reward or punish the Soviets are simply not likely to be effective in the absence of allied support. Furthermore, the Soviets must certainly doubt whether the United States can follow through on either its threats or its promises, given the recent record of U.S. inconsistencies and reversals on such matters.

D. Domestic Factors and Developments

A New Leadership

The staff delegation was in the U.S.S.R. at a time when the initial impact of leadership change was wearing off but while the Soviet bureaucracy remained uncertain about the strength and policy direction of the new leadership.

These early months of a post-Brezhnev leadership have raised the further question of whether real change is feasible. In a society where change normally comes so slowly as to be almost imperceptible to the Western eye, fundamental change is rarely even discussed. The fact that the question now occurs probably reflects the magnitude of the problems the Soviet Union faces in the 1980's plus Andropov's reputation for decisive management and imaginative tactics.

Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov was named General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union last November partly because so many other candidates had died or been shunted aside in the long twilight of the Brezhnev era. Most Western observers surmise that, of the remaining viable leaders, he was the only one with broad party experience who also apparently impressed his peers in the leadership as possessing sufficient power and intelligence to meet the country's needs.

In the Soviet political system, freedom to fill the several hundred key jobs in the party hierarchy does not go automatically with the job of General Secretary. Andropov starts out with most of these key jobs occupied by Brezhnev's people, and with at least one Politburo and Secretariat colleague (Chernenko) having an eye on his job and some support in the party apparatus for a claim.

The positions of political power are primarily lodged in the Politburo, which decides Soviet policies (12–20 members), and the Secretariat, a day-to-day implementor of policy and administration of the country. There are also key positions in the Central Committee apparatus (some 15 departments of experts in various fields which support the work of the Politburo and Secretariat), in the security organs, in the government ministries, and in the key media outlets.

Although Andropov appears clearly in charge and able to speak for the party, he probably does so at this stage on the basis of a fairly fragile leadership consensus. From the Moscow perspective, it was clear in late March that Andropov was only in the early stages of consolidating personal power. He had thus far made several changes in the security and propaganda apparatus and in economic ministries, and elevated his ally, Foreign Minister Gromyko, a notch in the government apparatus to a first deputy premiership. Several moves since, particularly the appointment of a new chief of the Central Committee department handling personnel appointments, suggest further progress. But Andropov will not be secure in power until he is certain that he has won over as allies a majority in the Politburo and Secretariat, or been able to replace them, and until he has put supporters in key jobs in the apparatus of the party Central Committee, among government managers, in the security organs, and in the press and propaganda establishment. This process culminates for a new Soviet leader when his personnel influence predominates in the Central Committee (of several hundred persons) which, though it meets only two or three times a year, is the base of Soviet political power. The next Central Committee will probably not be chosen until the next party Congress, now scheduled for 1986.

If Andropov wants to make any significant policy departures, he must first be politically strong enough to overcome the tenacious resistance of a hierarchy whose positions and privileges are based on the status quo. Power consolidation for a new Soviet General Secretary has proved in the past to be a roughly 3- to 8-year process. In Andropov's case, he is under special pressures. One is the urgent need, generally recognized inside as well as outside the Soviet Union, to increase economic productivity. The other is his age—he will be 69 in June 1983—and his poor health. In a power system as personalized as the Soviets', members of the hierarchy are inherently cautious and reluctant to risk their future careers on a leader who may not survive long.

Andropov's long-range political task is to groom leaders out of the largely hidden generation now in their 50s and younger. If Andropov leaves before a pool of successor talent has fully matured, one of the older and non-controversial leaders (like V. V. Grishin, full Politburo member and Moscow party boss) might well be chosen caretaker General Secretary until true generational trans-

fer of power could take place, unless Chernenko is able to overcome past reservations about his effectiveness.

The Domestic Economy

The urgent Soviet priority is the economy. Overall Soviet economic growth has dropped to between 1 and 2 percent a year. The growth of the working age population will decelerate sharply during the decade, particularly in the traditional industrial base of the European U.S.S.R. A variety of other problems in the Soviet economy—including chronic underproductivity in industry as well as agriculture, and lagging development of infrastructure and new raw material sources—are thus intensified, forcing Moscow into increasingly difficult resources allocation decisions.

It is too early to tell what the Andropov leadership's economic policy will be. So far, Andropov seems to be buying time with a three-point approach. Policies adopted during the last Brezhnev years, such as the Food Program, are being more fully implemented; debate in the press on economic policy is being allowed rather free latitude; and Andropov has associated himself with a highly visible crackdown on worker indiscipline and political corruption.

Additionally, prices on a number of non-food items in state stores, such as small industrial and household items of metal, have been raised without warning or fanfare. This may signal moves toward a more rational relationship between prices and actual production costs. The recent cuts in retail prices on a handful of goods suggest, however, that the new leadership may be reverting to the more usual procedures of balancing price increases with price decreases. The problem in the consumer sector of too much money chasing too few goods has not been eased.

Human Rights Situation

United States citizens feel deeply about human rights, which they consider a priority issue on the United States-U.S.S.R. agenda. However, human rights issues are not on the Soviets' agenda for the relationship at all. Despite having signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Soviets consider their policies on matters ranging from religious freedom to emigration to be internal matters, with Western concern seen as interference in Soviet internal affairs. This attitude extends even to the cases of 14 individuals who have U.S. citizenship by right of birth, whom the Soviets refuse to allow to leave. For example, Committee staff members visited Chicago-born Abe Stolar, who has wanted to leave the U.S.S.R. since the late 1930's. Exit permission granted to himself and his family in 1975 was inexplicably lifted literally at the airport on the day of their scheduled departure, and Soviet authorities have since toyed with the Stolars, inviting them to reapply and then rejecting the applications.

The current human rights situation in the Soviet Union is grim and getting worse. Organized Soviet dissent had been largely eliminated by the mid-1970's, but a renewed across-the-board crackdown began in 1979 and intensified in 1982. When the remnants of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group disbanded last fall, it marked the final sputter of efforts of Soviet human rights activists in various parts of the country to monitor Soviet compliance with Basket

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Three provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. The Ukrainian and other monitoring groups had been imprisoned or otherwise broken up much earlier.

Emigration of several ethinc groups peaked at various times in the 1976–80 period, but now the figures for all groups are very low, as shown in Table I. Deteriorating relations with the West played their part; for example, Jewish emigration and the overall emigration from the U.S.S.R. to the United States declined sharply after the invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. But the basic reason appears to be a renewed Soviet priority to mute any values competing with tightly controlled Soviet identity and conformity. There is reason to think that, when the Soviets opened up Jewish emigration in the early 1970's, they had no idea that as many would apply to leave as eventually did. The same pattern was repeated in other Soviet ethnic groups, and by the late 1970's Moscow appeared to have concluded that a potential hemorrhage had to be stopped and people forced to resign themselves to remaining in the Soviet Union.

An intensification of official harassment of religious practice inside the U.S.S.R., affecting both Jewish and Christian groups, has coincided with the crackdown on emigration. Whole communities of Soviet Jews in cities throughout the U.S.S.R. are being systematically hindered from studying or teaching Hebrew or otherwise preserving their heritage. Other manifestations of foreign values are also being choked off, such as making it much more difficult for Soviet citizens to marry foreigners. For those already married to foreigners, it has become more difficult for the Soviet partner to rejoin the foreign spouse abroad, a way of discouraging others from contemplating marriage with a foreigner. The appeal of the hard currency earnings involved in tourism from the West militates against ending this contact with the outside, but the spate of harassment of foreign tourists in touch with Soviet citizens in the summer of 1982 probably also was related to the general policy of sealing off outside influences.

The situation of individuals well known in the West has deteriorated. Sakharov's isolation at his place of internal exile in Gorkiy has affected him so much that he finds it nearly impossible to go on with his work. Shcharansky's solitary confinement and other deprivations in prison caused him to begin a hunger strike last Yom Kippur. That finally ended when he was again allowed to exchange letters with his mother, but Shcharansky's situation, including contact with his family, remains tenuous. Against these grim situations, there is an occasional ray of hope, as in Pentecostalist Christian Lydiya Vashchenko's being allowed to emigrate in April, and the subsequent decision of her family members and those of the Chymkhalov family to leave their U.S. Embassy Moscow refuge after nearly 5 years, and follow Lydiya's path back to Siberia to reapply for permission to leave.

TABLE I.—EMIGRATION FROM THE U.S.S.R.

Year	Jewish	Ethnic German	Armenian to the United States
1960–70	[1] 10,000	22,666	([2])
1971	14,000	886	([2])
1972	31,500	3,315	80
1973	33,500	4,436	185
1974	20,700	6,345	291
1975	13,300	5,752	455
1976	14,300	9,626	1,781
1977	16,700	9,119	1,390
1978	28,900	8,276	1,123
1979	51,300	6,947	3,656
1980	21,000	6,653	6,107
1981	9,100	3,595	1,903
1982	2,671	1,958	339

[1] Estimate.
[2] Negligible.

PART II: THE ARMS CONTROL AXIS

A. Introduction

The United States and the Soviet Union place different emphasis on the role of arms control in bilateral relations. The United States views arms control as one of many important aspects of the relationship, but one that is linked to Soviet behavior in general, such as the invasion of Afghanistan and interference in the affairs of Poland and Central America. In addition, the Reagan Administration believes that a potentially destabilizing imbalance exists both in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons as a result of Soviet SS–18 and SS–20 deployments. It hopes to use arms control to redress the current disparities through weapons deployed or arms control.

Soviet officials say they see arms control as the "primary testing ground" for bilateral relations. They reject linkage between arms control and other foreign policy issues, citing the completion of SALT I at a time when the United States was bombing Hanoi. The Soviets further claim that both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems are in balance, and hence arms control agreements should maintain the current parity.

Soviet officials in Moscow recently asserted that arms control negotiations are "stalled." During the last negotiating rounds of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) talks the Soviets clearly instructed their negotiators to avoid any sign that progress is being made. Soviet negotiators were reportedly "belligerent" and "nasty as hell."

Soviet officials took the opportunity during the staff's recent visit to list their complaints about current U.S. policy. They accused the United States of "building new types of first strike weapons" and developing "new offensive nuclear strategies," but they refused to acknowledge the threat posed to the United States by the deployment of SS–18s and SS–20s. They blamed the United States for the current impasse in arms control talks and criticized the United States for using "excessive public rhetoric."

Perhaps the most disturbing finding of the trip is the extent to which the current arms control impasse has led the Soviets to sound alarms about the overall state of bilateral relations. Soviet officials described bilateral relations using terms such as "a critical situation," "pushing us to the brink," "highly dangerous path," and "extreme pessimism." Soviet emphasis on deteriorating relations has other origins as well as the arms control situation and may be partially tactical to influence political events in Europe and the United States. But whether designed for effect or genuine,

a willingness to express a sense of alarm was widespread in the Soviet bureaucracy at the time of the staff's visit.

This chapter reviews issues related to the three major sets of ongoing United States-Soviet arms control negotiations: The Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) talks in Geneva; the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) also in Geneva, and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna.

The prospects for INF and START in 1983 do not appear good unless one or both governments propose meaningful shifts in their current negotiating position. Negotiations in 1984 may be further complicated by the U.S. Presidential election campaign, Soviet leadership politics and the Soviet response to U.S. missile deployments in Europe this December. The prospects for MBFR are somewhat better. Flexibility by the West and a genuine Soviet and Warsaw Pact desire to reach an agreement now could break the decade long MBFR deadlock. At a minimum, serious probing of the East's intentions is called for in the June round of the MBFR talks.

B. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Talks (INF)

Background to the INF Talks

In 1979, particularly in response to a rapidly mounting deployment of Soviet SS–20 intermediate range missiles capable of hitting targets throughout Western Europe, NATO decided to deploy Ground Launched Cruise Missiles and Pershing II missiles capable of hitting targets in the Soviet Union. NATO coupled its deployment decision to a commitment to negotiate limits on Intermediate-range Nuclear Force deployments of both sides. INF negotiations got underway in October 1980.

United States and Soviet differences in the INF talks are fundamental, stemming from different assessments of the current Eurostrategic balance and from conflicting political purposes. The United States officially counts a 6:1 INF imbalance in Moscow's favor and wants to use the talks to help redress the imbalance. To the United States, therefore, an INF agreement means major Soviet reductions and if necessary deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe. The Soviets count the military balance as being in parity and hence oppose efforts to unilaterally reduce Soviet forces or to sanction any U.S. INF deployments in Europe.

The military balance figures in Table II indicate that the Warsaw Pact-NATO INF imbalance (missiles and aircraft) is greater than 2:1 while the Soviet-U.S. balance is at least 4.5:1.

TABLE II.—INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE [1]

	Missiles	Aircraft	Totals
Soviet Union	641	1,735	2,376
Other Warsaw Pact		953	953
Total Warsaw Pact	641	2,688	3,329

TABLE II.—INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE [1]—Continued

	Missiles	Aircraft	Totals
United States		524	524
Other NATO	162	777	939
Total NATO	162	1,301	1,453

[1] Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies. The U.S. count, which shows a 6:1 Soviet lead in INF systems excludes the 939 non-U.S. NATO missiles and bombers but includes additional Soviet aircraft. The Soviet count shows both sides at just under 1,000 INF systems each. The Soviet count differs from these statistics in that it (1) includes United States and German Pershing I missiles in Europe, (2) includes only about 90 non-U.S. NATO bombers, (3) includes the aircraft from six U.S. aircraft carriers, (4) includes U.S. F–4's but excludes Soviet Fencers, and (5) excludes more than 2,200 Soviet and Warsaw Pact bombers.

The United States' political purpose in INF is to assure Western Europe that its security will remain coupled to U.S. security and to show that the United States is negotiating seriously on arms control. A major Soviet purpose appears to be to drive a wedge between the United States and the rest of NATO by demonstrating that it is more serious about arms control than the United States.

Each side has developed negotiating principles based upon its military and political goals that are diametrically opposed to the principles of the other side. The United States has established the principle that an INF agreement should:

—provide equal rights and limits between the United States and the Soviet Union,
—address only Soviet and United States systems and not British and French systems,
—be global in application and not export the European security problem to the Far East,
—not weaken the United States contribution to NATO's conventional defense, and,
—be verifiable.

In contrast, Soviet principles are that an agreement should:

—provide equality and equal security between the Soviet Union and all its possible enemies,
—take into account British and French nuclear delivery systems,
—be regional in application and not address the problems of the Far East at this time,
—not sanction U.S. missile deployments in Europe, and,
—include all types of medium-range weapons including aircraft, and not just missiles.

The United States' initial negotiating position was the zero-zero option, which would have eliminated all INF missiles on a global basis and would have eliminated all INF missiles on a global basis and would have required dismantling all Soviet SS–4s, SS–5s, and SS–20s. The new interim proposal retains the zero-zero goal but calls for global equality between the United States and Soviet Union at a finite, agreed number of warheads on land-based long range INF launchers. Under the proposal, the United States would have three times as many missiles as the Soviets, since each SS–20 has three warheads.

The Soviets have unfolded their negotiating proposal in several steps, but their proposals similarly do not stray from their own fundamental principles. Their first proposal was a moratorium which would preserve the existing status quo. More recently they have linked their INF freeze proposal to gradual mutual reductions of 300 INF systems for the Soviet Union and NATO. Perhaps the most clever version of the Soviet proposal to date was the Decem-

ber 1982 Andropov proposal which would deny U.S. missile deployment by establishing a missile subceiling at the 162 level for both NATO and the Soviet Union. The Andropov proposal was nothing more than the Brezhnev moratorium plus the transfer to Asia of a portion of those SS–20s defined by the Soviets as currently "intended for Europe." On May 3 Andropov further indicated Soviet willingness to define the limit in warheads as well as launchers, thereby meeting one of the U.S. concerns, although not others.

The negotations have been significantly complicated by the public nature of the INF debate. Each side has taken pains to develop positions which sound attractive to European public opinion and has dramatically offered those positions in speeches by the head of government. Informal initiatives by the negotiators became public in the United States, to the embarrassment of both sides, and have failed to receive full support in each capital.

Despite these circumstances, Ambassadors Nitze and Kvitsinsky did informally propose to their respective governments a possible compromise which was developed during their so-called "walk in the woods" in July 1982. That proposal contained the following basic elements that threaded their way between contending national principles:

—an equal number (set at 75) of Soviet and American INF launchers deployed so that they could strike targets in Europe,
—a ban on Pershing II and similar U.S. ballistic missile deployment in Europe, so that the 75 U.S. systems would be ground-launched cruise missiles,
—a ban on Soviet cruise missile deployment in Europe, so that the 75 Soviet systems would be SS–20s,
—a freeze on Soviet missiles at current levels (then about 90 missiles) in the far East,
—a ceiling of 150 on medium-range bombers in the European theater (to include F–111s, Blinders, Badgers, and Backfires), and,
—a qualitative and quantitative freeze on short-range nuclear delivery systems, including the Pershing I.

The informal proposal fulfilled most of the principles established by the United States. For example,

—it provided equal limits on launchers for the United States and the Soviet Union in the European theater which translated into a 300 to 225 U.S. warhead advantage,
—it did not address British or French systems,
—it was "global" in application in the sense that it did not sanction the export of Europe's security problem, but rather capped Soviet deployments in Asia at no cost to the Chinese or Japanese,
—it did not weaken the United States' contribution to NATO's conventional defense, and,
—experts believe that measures could be developed to verify the destruction of Soviet SS–4s, SS–5s, and some SS–20s and continued monitoring of remaining Soviet SS–20s.

There were two problems with this informal proposal from the Pentagon's perspective. First, the United States would not have "equal rights" to ballistic missiles in Europe, since U.S. Pershing IIs were banned. On the other hand, the Soviets would not have

"equal rights" to cruise missiles. Some Pentagon officials believe that losing the right to deploy ballistic missiles in Europe was a fatal flaw in the informal proposal since they believe the Pershing II is militarily and politically more significant to Europe than the cruise missile. The second problem they argued, was that the informal proposal did not set truly "global" ceilings, but only set equal ceilings for systems in Europe with a freeze in Asia. These two aspects of the proposal reportedly made it attractive enough for Ambassador Kvitsinsky to forward to Moscow Ambassador Nitze's original offer with minor modifications.

Against these two possible problems with the proposal, its State Department and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency supporters stressed the political value of such an agreement for United States-European relations. The proposal would have accomplished the following:

(1) the dismantling (at the time) of more than 100 Soviet SS-20s in addition to all their SS–4s and SS–5s;

(2) the firm "coupling" of United States and European security interests through cruise missile deployment sanctioned by treaty, and;

(3) the significant reduction of serious anti-nuclear protests in Europe.

The rejection of this formal proposal by both governments is surrounded by some confusion. In the United States, the proposal was reportedly tentatively agreed to by all parties including the Joint Chiefs of Staff until the Defense Department successfully intervened to oppose it. The proposal was modified by the United States to exclude the Pershing II ban, and Ambassador Nitze was authorized to continue discussions based on this modified proposal. Most observers believe that the Soviets were aware of this U.S. decision before they formally responded to the proposal. In any event, the Soviets rejected the Nitze-Kvitsinsky proposal and were unwilling to continue negotiations based upon the modifications made in Washington. Speculation continues as to whether the Soviets would have accepted the original Nitze-Kvitsinsky proposal.

Soviet officials in Moscow deflected questions about their position on the Nitze-Kvitsinsky proposal by saying that it has "not even been reported to them," and that "there was nothing for the Soviet Government to have subsequently rejected." With this response, they (1) protect their negotiator from charges of wrongdoing, (2) do not admit to rejecting a compromise that would be popular in Europe, and (3) leave the door slightly open for a possible resuscitation of the compromise. It is clear from discussions in Moscow, however, that the Soviets will be less amenable to "unofficial suggestions" in the future.

Had the United States accepted the proposal and the Soviets subsequently rejected it, public opinion in Europe would have been significantly more supportive of the U.S. position. More seriously, both sides may have missed a mutually beneficial opportunity to reach agreement on a key arms control issue.

Current Status of the INF Negotiations

The fourth round of the INF talks was deadlocked when President Reagan proposed his new interim position late in March. The

Soviets had refused during the round even to discuss areas of common agreement such as confidence building measures and verification, arguing that these details could be discussed only when agreements in principle had been reached on fundamental issues. Throughout the round the Soviet attitude was "we have made the Andropov proposal and now we are waiting for your response." The new American interim proposal places the ball back in the Soviet court; however, Andropov's May 3 statement indicating Soviet agreement to negotiate equal warhead ceilings contributed one modification to the Soviet position.

With the negotiators' return on May 17, they are exploring the March 30 Reagan proposal and the May 3 Andropov proposal. Table III, below, compares these two positions with the proposals made by negotiators Nitze and Kvitsinsky.

Andropov's brief May 3 statement on the Soviet INF position endorses a negotiation for equality in nuclear warheads as well as delivery vehicles, but repeated Soviet insistence on counting British and French nuclear systems. Additionally, the U.S.S.R. and the United States disagree on the numbers of warheads on British and French systems. Andropov also made no reference to Soviet SS-20s targeted on Asia. On nuclear aircraft deployed in Europe, Andropov referred to the "same" counting measures as for missiles (warheads as well as delivery vehicles), without further elaboration. Clarification of the exact elements of the revised Soviet position will be an important priority for the current Geneva round.

President Reagan did not specify the number of INF warheads in his proposal, but most observers expect Ambassador Nitze to propose a specific figure during this round. Administration officials indicate that the figure should be far enough above zero to make sense militarily, economically, and politically. The goal of the Reagan proposal remains a zero-zero solution, but Soviet agreement to this long-range principle is not a prerequisite. Once the interim agreement is in place, however, the Administration would expect to revive the zero-zero proposal.

The official European response to President Reagan's interim proposal was overwhelmingly positive. European governments had been lobbying for months to develop a response to Andropov. In the streets of Europe the zero option had become synonymous with intransigence. European governments are particularly pleased that the United States set no specific missile level, because as one German official explained, "it forces the Soviets to set the level of missiles in Europe, and thus the Soviets will have responsibility for U.S. deployments."

TABLE III.—COMPARISON OF INF NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS

Issue	Nitze-Kvitsinsky (July 1982)	Reagan interim proposal (March 1983)	Andropov proposal (May 1983)
Unit of account	Launchers (gives U.S. a 300 to 225 warhead advantage).	Warheads (gives the U.S. a 3:1-missile advantage).	Missiles and warheads.
Numbers	75 in Europe. Freeze in Asia.	Equal levels to be negotiated	Equal levels in warheads and delivery vehicles to be negotiated.

Missiles banned in Europe	Pershing II for U.S. Cruise for Soviets.	Freedom to mix with no ban on specific systems.	All U.S. missiles banned.
Equality	Between the United States and Soviets in Europe.	Between United States and Soviets.	Between NATO and U.S.S.R.
Regions covered	Europe and Asia	Global	Europe; Asia not mentioned.
British and French systems	Not included	Not included	Included.
Aircraft	150 limit on medium-range bombers.	Not included	Equal levels to be negotiated.
Short-range nuclear systems	Freeze at current levels	Previous U.S. position includes freeze at current levels.	Will support limitations, but not specified.

Committee staff interviews with West German officials indicate that they support the interim proposal in large measure because it will help relieve domestic political pressure. Many Social Democrats, however, criticize the proposal because it "does not go far enough." One SPD official told us that "if you want a solution in Geneva, you need to compromise on principles." Both SPD and government officials made the point that equal levels of United States and Soviet missiles are less important to them than assuring that escalation would occur and hence that United States and European security would remain coupled. One German official stressed that "the German Government needs an arms control agreement" and said he personally believes that to get an agreement "there may need to be a tiny disparity in favor of the Soviets."

After discussion with these German officials, it is clear that as public demonstrations increase in intensity during the year, the United States can expect the West German Government to begin pressing the United States for additional modifications to the current interim proposal. It is also clear that the West German Government is committed to the 1979 NATO Dual Track decision and is determined to deploy U.S. Pershing II missiles in December if no agreement is negotiated before then. What is not as clear is whether the Europeans appreciate the depth of feeling in the United States against agreements which are balanced in favor of the U.S.S.R.

Two days before the interim proposal was officially announced, senior Soviet Foreign Ministry officials told us that "the U.S.S.R. would welcome a new U.S. initiative on INF if it would preserve the existing balance in Europe and if it would result in a reduction, not an addition of new systems. The Foreign Ministry spokesman continued that "if the new proposal were designed to preserve the idea of the zero option by seeking to unilaterally disarm the U.S.S.R. or to add to the U.S. nuclear potential in Europe, it would be as unacceptable as the original U.S. proposal." In subsequent discussions, one Soviet Foreign Ministry official reacted angrily to President Reagan's interim proposal and predicted that the Soviet Union would not make a counter-proposal, but would have to make their case to the world.

On April 2, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko made the Soviet case to the world in a news conference in which he deemed the U.S. offer "unacceptable" and "not serious." Gromyko cited three separate grounds for rejecting the offer. First, the Soviets refused to accept the U.S. position that the limits must be global. Pointing

to U.S. nuclear forces deployed in the Far East, Gromyko said it was entirely "our business and our right" to decide whether missiles now deployed in Europe would be destroyed or relocated eastward. The Soviet minister warned that this U.S. condition alone "makes agreement impossible." Second, Gromyko insisted that the 144 British and French submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and the 18 French land-based INF missiles be counted against the U.S. total. Third, Gromyko stated that nuclear-capable aircraft deployed on U.S. carriers in European waters must also be included in any accord. Although Andropov's May 3 subsequent statement showed movement on counting warheads, it did not budge on any of these three objections to the United States' interim proposal that Gromyko had cited.

Although the Administration expressed "disappointment" over the "unconstructive" Soviet response, it noted that his "tone was relatively restrained, by Soviet standards." Administration officials have indicated that the United States will provide more details of the new offer in the current round of talks and that they consider the proposal very much alive.

Prospects for the INF Negotiations

Four issues remain critical to reaching an INF agreement: treatment of deployment, British and French systems, global limitations, Pershing II, and limits on aircraft. For various reasons, neither side appears to have the flexibility to compromise on these critical issues in the near future. It appears unlikely, therefore, that any INF agreement will be reached in 1983. U.S. deployments in West Germany, Italy and Britain are scheduled to begin in December 1983, and will most likely take place in the absence of an arms control agreement. The Soviet reaction to these deployments could well determine whether or not any INF agreement is possible in 1984.

First, the Soviets, by offering the Andropov missile and warhead subceiling proposal, have specifically highlighted the problem of British and French nuclear delivery systems. A Soviet Defense Ministry representative recently told us "there cannot be an equality between the United States and the Soviet nuclear weapons in Europe, since that is fully in contradiction with the principle of equality and equal security . . . but equality between NATO and the Soviet Union can be achieved." A senior Soviet Foreign Ministry official elaborated by noting that "we have more enemies than you do."

The Administration has rejected the Soviet position on Allied systems for several reasons. First, the British and French both strongly object to the United States negotiating in any way with respect to their sovereign missile systems. Second, the British and French systems have nothing to do with U.S. nuclear umbrella over all of NATO. Third, the Soviets themselves heavily discount the value of British and French systems since as one Soviet observer stated, "they could not be used by the United States to initiate a first strike." Fourth, the Soviet proposal would violate the U.S. principle of equal rights and limitations. Fifth, it would give the Soviets an overwhelming lead in the narrow, but important category of land-based intermediate-range warheads targeted at Europe.

And finally, the characteristics of British and French missile systems are similar to the characteristics of United States and Soviet SLBMs, which are under discussion in the START talks rather than in the INF talks.

Second, the global limitations issue is in many respects the Asian equivalent of the debate over British and French missiles. The Soviet Union is rapidly deploying SS–20s in Asia to offset what one Soviet official called "countries in the East more dangerous than the United States" and to "counter American nuclear delivery systems in Japan, South Korea, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf." The United States is under strong pressure from its Asian allies and especially Japan to prevent the export of Europe's security problems to Asia. United States and Soviet positions are once again diametrically opposed. The Soviet position would allow any SS–20s in excess of the agreed European ceiling to be transferred to Soviet Asia. The United States interim position might force the Soviets to destroy all their INF missiles in Asia if the Soviets want to maintain United States-Soviet INF warhead equality in Europe.

Third, Soviet public discussion of the INF problem places great weight on the deployment of Pershing IIs in West Germany. The Soviets say that while U.S. cruise missiles present a political and arms control problem for them, Pershing IIs present a real military threat. They say that the presence of 108 Pershing IIs with an estimated 12-minute flight time to targets in the U.S.S.R. would present a new threat of "strategic decapitation," by which they mean destruction without much warning of their principal command and control centers. Strategic decapitation plus new MX and Trident missile accuracies, the Soviets conclude, could eventually make them vulnerable to a U.S. first strike. They fear that the 1,800 km range Pershing II missile can easily be upgraded to a range of 2,500 km, and hence place Moscow at immediate risk.

The U.S. reponse to these Soviet arguments is that the Pershing II has an 1,800 km range and that 90 percent of Soviet strategic forces and all their strategic command and control links are out of Pershing II range. Administration officials conclude that Soviet arguments are designed to persuade Europeans to halt the missile's deployment. These officials are concerned that any effort to delay or ban the Pershing II deployment in Germany would negatively affect cruise missile deployments in Britain and Italy because of the need for "simultaneity of deployments."

Fourth, the Soviets would limit medium-range bombers in an agreement, while the U.S. position calls for limits on missiles only at this time, although State Department spokesmen have indicated a general willingness to discuss bomber limitations. Ironically, the Soviets have the most to lose by raising the bomber issue because the United States counts 2,700 SU–17s, SU–24s and MIG–27s as being comparable to U.S. F–4s, A–6s, and A–7s. The Soviets probably see the aircraft issue as a way to reduce the number of U.S. aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. If the first three issues discussed can be settled, however, negotiators believe that solution can be found to the bomber issue.

Discussions on INF matters soon turn to a critical question: What will the Soviets do when U.S.A. missile deployments begin in December? European and U.S officials all hope that deployment

will create a new reality for the Soviets and that they will be more forthcoming in the talks. Many observers believe that to date the Soviets have felt they could afford to continue with a hard line INF negotiating position because European demonstrations might prevent missile deployment, and because the United States has been equally adamant about its negotiating position.

The Soviet response to this NATO hope for flexibility is to threaten dire consequences if deployment take place. A Soviet Foreign Ministry official told us recently that U.S. deployments in Europe would create a qualitatively new situation which would "endanger" the INF talks. He continued that "the U.S.S.R. would not be idle in responding." A Soviet military representative added that the United States is wrong in believing that deployments would make the Soviets more flexible at the negotiating table.

Implementation of these Soviet threats could include Soviet termination of the INF talks, a return to unrestrained Soviet SS–20 deployment in Europe, deployment of Soviet cruise missiles in Europe, and Soviet actions which place U.S. territory in a situation of "analogous risk." In response to a request for a clarification of the "analogous risk" comment, Foreign Ministry officials told us that the Soviet Union did not envisage placement of new missiles in Cuba because it was to the United States and Soviet advantage that both sides adhere to the 1962 understandings on Cuba. He said that the Soviet Union "had not and would not violate its commitments under the understandings." Soviet missile deployments elsewhere in Latin America would seem to be extremely dangerous, both because of U.S. reaction and because of political instability throughout the region. The Soviets might also move additional ballistic missile submarines or eventually deploy sea-launched cruise missiles near U.S. shores, but that would reverse a recent Soviet trend and place Soviet naval forces in greater jeopardy. A further deterioration of United States-Soviet relations could begin in December of 1983 as the United States deploys INF weapons in Europe and the Soviets respond.

A final compromise on INF could take one of several forms. One possibility is a modified version of the Nitze-Kvitsinsky proposal. A second alternative, recently mentioned by Henry Kissinger, would result in Soviet and U.S. proportional reductions in INF missiles from current Soviet levels and NATO planning figures respectively. Under this proposal, the equality between the United States and the Soviets would be in the *proportion* of the reduction.

Should all attempts at compromise fail, several observers have suggested merging the INF and START talks. Since British and French systems are the largest single stumbling block, these observers believe that the relative size of this stumbling block would be brought into perspective if the talks were merged. Neither the United States nor the Soviet side appears ready to suggest such a merger at this time, however. U.S. negotiators believe it would concede the SS–20 issue to the Soviets, while the Soviets believe the European issue is "most urgent" and requires separate attention. West German officials also oppose merging the talks at this time, primarily because much of the influence they now have over the INF talks might be lost in a merger.

C. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

Background to the START Talks

As is the case with the INF talks, the United States and the Soviet Union have a significantly different assessment of the strategic nuclear balance and hence have fundamentally different START negotiating positions. The Administration entered the START talks with the view that the Soviets had achieved a "definite margin of superiority" as a result of highly accurate MIRVed heavy missiles and its goal in the talks was to redress the balance. The Soviets entered the START talks with the same assessment held by both sides during the SALT talks: that there is nuclear parity and the talks should maintain roughly the existing balance.

Table IV displays the United States and Soviet negotiating positions and indicates how far apart the two positions are. One senior U.S. negotiator simply concluded "we are playing in different ballparks."

The U.S. START negotiating position was announced by President Reagan during his May 9, 1982 speech at Eureka College. The proposal calls for deep reductions and special emphasis on the most destabilizing systems. It suggests ballistic missile warhead reductions to an equivalent level of 5,000 each, with a limit on the number of land-based ICBM warheads of half that total. To meet the overall warhead ceiling, both sides would have to reduce their existing warheads by one-third, but the Soviets would have to reduce their land-based ICBM warheads by almost 60 percent to meet the ICBM warhead subceiling. In addition, they would be encouraged to build almost twice as many SLBM warheads as they now have.

TABLE IV.—START NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

Issue	Current levels (estimate)		Negotiating position	
	United States	Soviet	United States	Soviet
Ballistic missile warhead total	7,250	7,400	5,000	NA (but may accept some limit).
Land-based ballistic missile warhead total	2.150	6,100	2,500	NA.
SLBM warhead total	5,100	1,300	2,500	Ban new-type SLBMs like Trident and Typhoon.
Ballistic missiles totals	1,700	2,350	850	NA.
Ballistic missile and bomber total[1]	2,275	2,600	1,250	1,800.
Heavy/medium missile subceiling	52	[2]308	[2]110	NA.
		[3]788	[3]210	
Missile throw-weight (phase II)	2 MKG	5 MKG	([4])	NA.
Cruise missile (phase II)	([5])	([6])	([7])	Ban deployment of all cruise with range above 600 km.

[1] Includes all SALT accountable B–52's and Soviet Air Force Backfire bombers.
[2] Heavy.
[3] Heavy/medium.
[4] Equal levels in phase II.
[5] In production.
[6] Under development.
[7] Bomber loading limit for ALCM's.

The President's Eureka College speech also called for a second phase in the negotiations aimed at getting equality in ballistic missile throw-weight and limiting cruise missiles. To meet this goal of throw-weight equality, the Soviets would have to cut their existing

throw-weight by at least 60 percent just to match the current U.S. capability. Subsequently, the United States expanded its Phase I negotiating position to include (1) dramatic reductions of Soviet medium and heavy missiles to roughly one-quarter of their current level, and (2) a ceiling of 400 on each country's heavy bombers (with the Backfire included as a heavy bomber).

The Soviet Union has completely rejected the U.S. position as well as its underlying assumptions. They charge that the U.S. position seeks to fundamentally restructure the existing Soviet force to make it a mirror image of the U.S. force. Second, they charge that acceptance of the U.S. position would force them to scrap 90 percent of the ICBM force. And finally, they charge that the U.S. proposal would force them into the "intensified construction" of new weaponry.

The Soviet counter-proposal is a ceiling of 1,800 on strategic missiles and bombers, with freedom to mix within those totals. The proposal would result in a 25-percent reduction in Soviet systems and a 10-percent reduction in operational U.S. systems. The Soviet proposal would also require a ban on the deployment of new types of submarine missiles and a ban on cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 km. Many of the other provisions of the Soviet proposal are similar to SALT II provisions.

While the Administration regards the Soviet proposal as unacceptable, the United States has not rejected it completely. The missile/bomber ceiling is a significant reduction from the ceilings set in SALT II and some U.S. negotiators still believe it could serve as a starting point for future compromise. The limitations on Trident II missiles and long range cruise missiles, however, would constrain the most invulnerable U.S. missile force and would significantly complicate the strategic bomber penetration problem. The two proposed limitations would reduce the second strike capability of the United States, and hence they are strongly criticized by U.S. negotiators.

Current Status of the START Talks and Related Issues

The third round of the START talks was also marked by regression rather than progress. At the end of that second round, some U.S. negotiators expressed guarded optimism about the chance for reaching agreement at least on a limited number of issues. By the end of the third START round, however, U.S. negotiators were much more pessimistic. While the United States tabled new positions on heavy bombers and ALCM limitations, the Soviets refused to budge on their positions and spent most of the round criticizing the U.S. position rather than elaborating on their own. Observers speculate that the Soviets refused to negotiate seriously because of the large differences in negotiating positions and because they are awaiting INF developments. The Soviets have threatened to withdraw their current START proposal, if the United States deploys INF systems in Europe.

The confrontational nature of the recent negotiating round and the difference in negotiating positions have led to some U.S. START negotiators to doubt that there will be a strategic arms limitation agreement during the next 2 years. One senior U.S. negotiator said that if the Administration wants an agreement during its

first 4 years in office, it will have to move fast and make dramatic changes. No "fast moves or dramatic changes" are expected on the part of the U.S. team. There is speculation that some U.S. negotiating flexibility could be gained by officially merging Phase I and Phase II of the talks (and thus allowing early discussion of cruise missiles), but this could also accelerate discussion of the difficult issue of equality in missile throw-weight and add another barrier to agreement.

During these difficult negotiations, the U.S. START delegation was hit by a leak of the so-called "Rowny memorandum to Adelman" which commented in unflattering terms on many members of the team. Throughout the rest of the negotiating round, Ambassador Rowny's subordinates maintained their professionalism and tried not to allow the incident to interfere with the immediate business at hand. Behind the scenes, however, morale on the team has deteriorated to the point where its future effectiveness could be seriously impaired. One member of the team even described the atmosphere as being "like the last week in the Fuhrer's bunker."

Given the uncertainties surrounding the START negotiating process, the interim SALT compliance regime takes on renewed importance. The compliance regime faces new problems, however, because of a possible Soviet violation of the "one new type rule" in SALT II. The Soviets acknowledge testing two ICBM missiles recently, but they argue that one, the so-called PL–5, is actually a follow-on to the SS–13 and hence allowable under SALT II. In discussions in Moscow, the Soviets stressed on several occasions the importance they place on continuing the SALT compliance regime. And yet some believe that the Soviets may have violated at least one aspect of the unratified SALT II agreement. The manner in which the potential violation is managed could have an important impact on the future of arms control for the next several years.

On another matter related to verification, the Soviets told us in Moscow that they had decided to reject the Administration's proposal to discuss enhanced verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. They did not complain that the new verification measures proposed by the United States were too intrusive. Rather they objected to the United States "changing treaties after they are signed." They said that the United States should ratify the two treaties as signed and then use the cooperative measures provided for in the treaty to test the verification provisions. If the existing but untried measures prove unsatisfactory, they said, then both parties could use the consultative measures set forth in the treaty to strengthen the verification provisions. Soviet officials said that the U.S.S.R. would nevertheless continue to abide by the terms of the two treaties as long as the United States does the same.

Prospects for the Control of Strategic Weapons

The prospects for agreement on a START treaty with the Soviets based on current negotiating positions are poor. U.S. intermediate-range nuclear weapons deployment in Europe later this year could disrupt the START talks. Even if this problem can be avoided, however, the Soviets are clearly not interested in agreeing to the sig-

nificant restructuring of both forces envisioned by the United States.

New concepts are under discussion in Washington that could alter the prospects for a United States-Soviet treaty on strategic weapons reductions. For example, the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission could change the United States START position in several important ways. It could result in the raising or even the deletion of the missile ceiling currently proposed by the United States. It could reduce the emphasis previously given to throw-weight because of the Commission's assessment that U.S. ICBM vulnerability may not be as significant in the near term as had previously been assumed. It could encourage efforts to reverse the MIRVing process by emphasizing single warhead missiles in the talks.

In addition, the Congress is considering several arms control proposals which could modify the Administration's approach. The House voted for an immediate, mutual and verifiable nuclear freeze, as well as other proposals. In the Senate, Senators Cohen and Nunn have introduced a "mutual builddown" concept which as modified by Senator Percy calls for the destruction of two strategic warheads for every new one built. The Scrowcroft Commission indicated qualified support for the builddown concept as an interim measure. President Reagan endorsed the general concept in letters to the three Senators.

Because these new and sometimes contending strategic concepts could profoundly affect strategic arms control prospects for this next decade, we asked Soviet officials and strategic analysts for their opinion on each. Table V below provides a short compilation of Soviet views on these issues.

TABLE V.—SOVIET VIEWS ON CURRENT STRATEGIC ISSUES

Strategic Vulnerability.—"The Soviet Union with its heavy reliance on fixed ICBMs should be more concerned about the problem of ICBM vulnerability than the United States. The problem is greatly exaggerated, but it could become a problem in the future if U.S. deployments continue. The U.S. should not worry about a surgical Soviet first strike because to take out the ground forces of the other side you need to launch so many missiles that the attack will be seen not as an attack on missile fields but rather on the entire country. The other side would have to retaliate."

Mobile ICBMs.—"The priority task now is to reach an agreement on reductions to agreed levels of strategic systems. Once that is done we can better discuss mobility. Mobility will solve the vulnerability problem, but it will be difficult to verify and could thus cause other security problems. It will be very costly, but if the United States continues its current programs, you will force us out of the silos."

Single Warhead Missiles.—"The U.S.S.R. initially warned the United States against MIRV deployment on the grounds that it would be destabilizing. Moving to single warhead missiles is a good idea, but it will take a lot of time and money."

Ballistic Missile Defense.—"Ballistic missile defense is destabilizing. Nothing has been devised that is better than mutual assured destruction."

The Nuclear Freeze.—"We are for a nuclear freeze. It is the best way to protect against strategic vulnerability."

The Cohen-Nunn Builddown.—"We are now studying it. It looks interesting."

D. MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION TALKS (MBFR)

Background to the MBFR Talks

The United States and our NATO allies, responding to the Mansfield troop withdrawal amendment and fearful of the consequences of continuing the unfavorable conventional force balance in Cen-

tral Europe, began the MBFR talks with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1973. During this early phase much of the discussion centered on establishing a unit of account. The NATO alliance preferred a negotiating framework based on manpower while the East advocated unit reductions. Eventually, the Pact reluctantly agreed to accept NATO's position.

Until 1976, the negotiators concentrated on finding agreed definitions and ways of counting forces on both sides. NATO viewed this effort as a means of documenting the disparity in force levels favoring the East and as an essential first step before it could agree to troop reductions. Having achieved some progress on these points, NATO asked that both sides table data on their respective forces. For a time the Pact negotiators balked at this requirement. But in 1976, the East relented and tabled an aggregate strength total purportedly derived from NATO's own counting rules. Unfortunately, the data provided differed from Western intelligence estimates by over 150,000 men. The discrepancy, in effect, reduced the Pact totals to parity with NATO. Pending a resolution of the differences, the West could not agree to reductions.

Since then, the debate over the data discrepancy has dominated both the formal and informal discussions. The West sought to obtain additional information in an effort to clarify the discrepancy. The East countered that it had provided its best figures in 1976, and viewed NATO's questions as an attempt to catch them in a lie. Although the Pact showed some flexibility early on, more recent statements and actions strongly suggest that further discussions of the date discrepancy will not be productive.

Current Status of the MBFR Talks

Despite the dispute over force data, both sides tabled draft treaties in 1982 that went beyond earlier positions. NATO previously supported reductions to a common ceiling based on a series of separate negotiated agreements beginning with a United States-U.S.S.R. cutback. The new proposal adopted the Pact concept of one agreement consisting of successive phases. It retained a provision for an American and Soviet first phase drawdown but guaranteed that other NATO partners would participate in later phases. The acceptance by the East of a stringent regime of "associated measures" to insure compliance, however, became a crucial element of NATO's initiative.

NATO's demand for "associated measures" reflected a desire for adequate verification procedures and the depth of suspicion generated by the data discrepancy issue. The measures deemed necessary by the West included:

—provision for observers at permanent exit/entry points in the reduction area;
—periodic exchange of force data;
—advance notification of large troop movements; and
—annual quotas of on-site inspections.

The Warsaw Pact draft treaty also went beyond its previous proposals. The East, for the first time, confirmed that it accepted the NATO requirement for the United States and the U.S.S.R. to reduce their forces, particularly ground forces, in the first phase. Moreover, the Pact accepted NATO's concept of a common ceiling

by both sides, set at 700,000 men in the ground forces and an overall ceiling of 900,000 men. Referencing NATO's "associated measures," the Pact agreed in principle to observers at *temporary* exit points, pre-notification of *major* troop movements and a data exchange *after* the completion of reductions. In addition, the east tabled a refined proposal in February 1983, calling for a U.S.S.R.-United States troop reduction of 20,000 and 13,000 men respectively, and hinted that if NATO accepted its plan in principle the Pact could be very flexible on dealing with its request for "associated measures."

NATO negotiators spent much of the last round probing the Pact for details. Although the West did not reject the Pact proposal out-of-hand, it did question its seriousness because it failed to provide specifics on an adequate verification package. The East parried by consistently refusing to go beyond the framework it had tabled. The Pact insisted that as a first step NATO would have to accept its proposal in principle. At that same time, the Pact negotiators continued to hint broadly that such an acceptance in principle would enable them to be much more forthcoming on NATO's "associated measures."

The Pact's lack of flexibility provoked the head of the U.S. delegation, Ambassador Morton Abramowitz to declare that the two sides:

> . . . cannot build an actual agreement upon protestations of good intent and ambiguous obligations. Our work in Vienna concerns matters affecting the security of missions of people. Generalizations will not suffice for effective verification. The East must be willing to address constructively Western verification requirements.

Future Prospects of the MBFR Talks

The future of the MBFR talks remain unclear. On one hand, MBFR offers more hope for a breakthrough on arms control than either START or INF. Although still far apart, the positions of each side contain interesting possibilities for forward movement. On the other hand, difficulties in other arms control forums may spill over and doom progress in Vienna. Above all, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact must make up their minds how serious they are on reaching an agreement.

The East must decide once and for all that it is in a negotiation and not simply an international propaganda debate. This means, for example, that the Pact negotiators should be prepared to engage in detailed discussions concerning its proposal and the type and extent of "associated measures" it is prepared to accept. Officials in Moscow indicated that they have real hope for an agreement in Vienna. Now it appears up to them to match their hopeful rhetoric with positive deeds. Otherwise, the prognosis for MBFR does not appear much brighter than for the nuclear weapons talks in Geneva.

NATO must also decide that it really wants an agreement and not just a forum for discussion of European security issues. The member states should be prepared during the current round to probe seriously the Pact proposals to determine if sufficient flexibility exists on "associated measures" to justify exploring new ways of resolving the dispute over force data. Although all agree that the data discrepancy remains a serious problem, some in the West

appear to have gone further and seem more intent on catching the Soviets in a lie than achieving progress in the talks. Several arms control specialists suggest that if the Soviets are truly interested in proceeding to an agreement, several bold approaches to the data problem, fully consistent with allied interests, may be possible. The West, however, must have the will, and our negotiators the flexibility, to test and probe for flexibility and interest on the part of the East. In that regard, the next round of negotiations could be crucial.

PART III: ECONOMIC, REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL ISSUES

A. United States-Soviet Economic Relations

Trade between the Soviet Union and the West increased an unprecedented tenfold in the decade of the 1970's. This willingness to open the Soviet economy to the West reflected deliberate efforts to exploit the potential grains from trade and to improve political relations in an era of détente. The expansion of trade was also greatly facilitated by the tremendous windfall gains in foreign exchange earnings that accrued to the Soviet Union, as a major oil exporter, from the OPEC price rise. Even after this increase, however, total Soviet imports in 1980 from the West amounted to only $26 billion (or 1.9 percent of GNP.)

The prospects for continued growth in East-West trade in the decade of the 1980's are much bleaker. Economically, widespread concern about Soviet bloc creditworthiness since 1980, plus the Soviet need to use hard currency to import large quantities of grain, are limiting commercial relations. American dissatisfaction with the fruits of détente and concern over leakage of militarily useful technology caused the United States to deliberately restrict trade. The imposition of economic sanctions by the West after Afghanistan and Poland also had a chilling effect on Soviet willingness to become more economically dependent on the West.

For example, the December 1980 directives for the 5-year plan 1981-85 did not even specify a target for foreign trade turnover—a departure from past practice—reflecting uncertainty among Soviet planners about the appropriate role of trade with the West. The draft guidelines anticipated trade only "with those developed capitalistic countries that show an interest in cooperation with the Soviet Union." When specific trade turnover targets were finally announced in late 1981, they had been scaled back to allow a growth in trade with non-Communist countries of only about 2.5 percent a year.

Perhaps even more important than the planning guidelines is the deterioration in the underlying economic fundamentals:

—Soviet oil production will begin to decline significantly in the 1980's and will partly offset the higher foreign exchange earnings from natural gas exports. Unless energy prices experience another major upward rush, oil and gas will not provide the windfall source of import financing of the past decade (fuel exports accounted for three-fourths of the growth in Soviet foreign exchange earnings in 1970–80).

—The scope for major increases in other Soviet exports appear relatively limited at least through the 1980's.

—Soviet reluctance to incur sizeable foreign debts will limit their willingness to finance imports that cannot be largely paid for through export earnings.

Within this rather austere climate, the trade prospects for U.S. exporters appear even dimmer.

—The economic sanctions imposed because of Afghanistan and Poland have had a devastating effect on America's reputation as a reliable supplier (a particularly important consideration in a country which places such a high premium on predictability because of its cumbersome 5-year planning process).

—Soviet reluctance to trade with the United States for political reasons is compounded by their desire to balance bilateral accounts, which puts the United States at a disadvantage because of our large surplus on agricultural trade (whereas the continental European countries tend to run deficits because of their energy imports from the U.S.S.R.).

—Even if the United States were willing to sign another long-term agreement for grain trade (which accounts for 75 percent of U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R.), the negotiations would be complicated by the Soviet desire to incorporate other troublesome provisions (e.g., limits on the amounts to be shipped on high-cost U.S. bottoms) which might make any agreement politically unacceptable in the United States.

Even if these specific concerns turn out to be unduly pessimistic, the potential U.S. role in overall East-West trade must be kept in overall perspective. The Soviet economy (and to a lesser extent the East European economies as well) will never become "open" to a Western extent. They are largely premised on autarkic principles to avoid outside dependence. U.S. trade, therefore, is likely to be of relatively minor importance to the overall United States-Soviet relationship absent a major change in the political climate.

In short, the United States is increasingly likely to become a "residual supplier" in a slowly-growing market facing intensifying competition from other countries. Trade, therefore, will likely be overshadowed by other items on the agenda between the two countries. Indeed, the most important aspect of the United States-Soviet trade will probably be as a source of conflict with our Allies as we attempt to limit Western credit subsidies and tighten the restrictions on high technology exports to the Soviet Union.

B. The Alliance Implications

Even if the United States-Soviet bilateral trade remains relatively limited, the economic aspects of the relationship are extremely important because of unresolved differences among the Allies. The potential damage to the Western alliance resulting from different views toward East-West trade was vividly demonstrated by the bitter European reactions to sanctions that the United States imposed on exports for the Soviet gas pipeline.

In the aftermath of the gas pipeline dispute a number of initiatives were launched to try to reach agreement on a coordinated policy. At the most basic level, there is sufficient consensus to hold out promise of a common approach. For example, all the major Western countries, including Japan, agree that:

—Common guidelines are needed to minimize or eliminate credit subsidies to the Eastern bloc;
—Trade has to be carefully controlled to avoid directly enhancing Soviet military capabilities;
—Procedures must be developed to regularize the inevitable injection of political considerations into West-East commercial relations.

In order to develop the specifics of these general approaches a number of studies are currently underway under OECD, NATO, the International Energy Agency, and the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) auspices. Most of these studies are due to be completed by this summer. However, there are many impediments to reaching agreement:

On credits, it will be technically difficult to reach agreement on an export financing regime which would eliminate credit subsidies. This is partly because of widely different interest rates among the exporting countries and partly because some of the allies are much more willing then the United States to use credit subsidies as a matter of national commercial policy.

On controlling technology, most of our Allies are opposed to extending export controls beyond items which "directly" contribute to Soviet military capabilities. They generally resist tightening controls for "grey area" or "dual use" technology which many in the United States fear does, in fact, significantly enhance the Soviet military.

On political limits to East-West trade, most Europeans favor greater economic interdependence as a stabilizing influence while many in the United States fear the Soviets gain undue influence over European policies. The Europeans also generally have a much larger economic stake in expanding trade with the East. Thus, Americans are inherently more inclined to try to use trade as a policy instrument in overall East-West relations.

It is simply too early to predict whether mutually satisfactory arrangements can be worked out in these areas. The stakes, however, are high. If disputes over East-West trade policy continue among the allies, they will have a corrosive effect on the ability of the West to deal with other crucial issues of defense posture, arms control, and Soviet initiatives outside the region.

C. A Few Positive Footnotes

While none of the Soviet officials, U.S. diplomats, or United States or foreign businessmen disagreed with this overall pessimistic assessment, there were some positive comments:

Everyone that we interviewed felt that closer economic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union would be at least marginally helpful in generating more contact and better mutual understanding.

There are some areas in addition to high technology (which is limited by security considerations) where both countries could gain mutual advantage from trade. For example, several Soviet officials noted that the United States had much to offer

in the area of agribusiness as well as grains and the U.S.S.R. has raw materials of interest to the United States.

None of the U.S. businessmen felt there was an overt or systematic campaign by the government against U.S. products per se and they believed U.S. firms still had a good reputation for product quality and service.

The competitive position of many U.S. products should improve as the dollar falls to a more realistic relationship with the currencies of major competitors.

Some U.S. businessmen felt that the United States could regain much of its reputation as a reliable supplier if concrete assurances of contract sanctity could be given (such as a legislative guarantee that all contracts would be honored for a fixed period, say 270 days, after entering into force). Others were more skeptical, however, that such assurances would keep our major competitors (especially French and Japanese) from undercutting our sales efforts with invidious comparisons about our unreliability as a supplier.

Since U.S. exports to the Soviet Union are so heavily weighted toward agricultural products (about 80 percent, if agricultural inputs are included), a firming of agricultural prices would improve the terms of trade and significantly increase our export earnings even if quantities shipped did not increase significantly.

D. Regional Arenas

On regional issues, Committee staff discussion with Soviet officials and specialists concentrated on East Asia, Southwest Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Specific interviews could not be arranged with Soviets specializing on Latin America, although there were brief discussions and informal opportunities to discuss Central America and the Caribbean.

Eastern Europe

The Soviets with whom we met resisted discussing recent events in Poland. They emphasized the degree to which developments there were both overblown in the Western press and peculiar to Poland. Any suggestion that the development of Solidarity was an omen for the future of the Eastern bloc was dismissed.

Soviet leaders must increasingly view their Warsaw Pact allies with considerable ambivalence. While Poland is the only country which constitutes a genuine political threat to Soviet control—although less so today than in the recent past—the growth and debt problems of nearly all of the COMECON countries make them growing economic liabilities for the Soviet Union.

Although Eastern Europe has been resistant to political pressure for greater openness, it is an area whose political future must pose serious problems for Soviet planners.

Regardless of the success with which events in Poland have been controlled for the time being without overt Soviet intervention, they have posed probably the greatest threat to the Soviet position in Eastern Europe since the war. Solidarity's challenge is that of a genuine workers' revolt in a system which purports to govern in

the name of the worker. Although undoubtedly relieved at the Polish army's success in disrupting the movement and undercutting its leadership, the Soviets must worry that the Polish Communist Party has been thoroughly discredited, the economy left in a shambles, and the armed forces placed in the role of internal enforcers. In short, even if the Polish experience is not readily duplicated in other bloc countries, it poses a visible challenge to the precarious legitimacy of all of them, and even to the Soviet Union itself.

The ability of the United States or other Western countries to affect events in Poland will probably continue to be slight for the foreseeable future. The United States could probably make Poland's economic crisis even worse, by requiring default, making new loans more difficult to obtain, and tightening trade restrictions even further. However, this might well not help the Polish people and nation. There is even a danger that a further prolonged economic deterioration might allow the military regime to sue Solidarity as a scapegoat for increasing hardship.

Even given the severe limits to what the United States can do to affect the decisions of the Polish and Soviet Governments, the United States can serve the cause of the Polish people by continuing to focus international attention on the Solidarity movement, its leaders and its objectives. The results of these efforts will be felt only in the long term, but it would be a far greater tragedy if the Polish people were to feel completely isolated and forgotten in the West.

Central America and the Caribbean

The Soviets deny any involvement in the Salvadoran insurgency or any direct instigation of the Nicaraguan regime in that connection. These countries, they argue, like all other Central American countries, are facing genuine revolutionary uprisings which are the consequence of years of U.S.-supported repression and intervention.

The Soviets further deny that there is any unusual increase in military equipment and supplies to Cuba or that they have any intention of suing the island as a Soviet military base in the region. While they acknowledge that there has been a heightened state of preparedness in Cuba, they claim it is a result of increased fears of a potential invasion by the United States. The Soviets attribute this fear to the statements of former Secretary of State Haig about "going to the source" of the Central American insurgencies. As a high Soviet official put it, "Cuba is our ally" and we will continue to have "normal bilateral relationships." They insist that they are abiding, and will continue to abide by the "Kennedy-Khrushchev understandings" of 1962 which followed the Cuban missile crisis. Those secret understandings, which were never embodied in a single written agreement, involved a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba in return for a Soviet pledge not to reintroduce nuclear weapons there. At the same time, the Soviets have recently made a veiled threat with respect to the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe that they will be forced to place U.S. territory at "comparable" risk.

Given the enormous risks involved in repeating the quick-fix strategy which brought about the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets

are unlikely to actually seek to deploy intermediate range missiles in Cuba or Nicaragua. Despite their vague suggestions of "reciprocity," there is no direct indication of such a plan. Shifts in submarine deployments directly off the U.S. coastline would probably offer a better way to increase the short-range threat with less direct risk.

In view of the multi-billion dollar subsidies which the Soviets provide to Cuba to underwrite Castro's worldwide adventures, they will undoubtedly continue to work through the Cubans to encourage future difficulties in the U.S. backyard. The value of the region for anti-U.S. propaganda purposes, and as a major political distraction for the United States, also suggests that they would have little reason to favor broader political resolution of the issues generating revolutionary grievances. A low-profile, low-risk strategy will probably continue to have the biggest pay-off for the Soviets in this part of the world.

East and South Africa

The continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia symbolizes for many Americans one of the most objectionable aspects of Soviet behavior in recent years: the use of surrogates to affect the outcome of local conflicts. Soviet officials, of course, minimize the significance of the Cuban presence. In Angola and Ethiopia, they maintain, the Cubans are present at the invitation of the governments concerned to resist or deter aggression from South Africa and Somalia. The fact that the Cubans played a more instrumental role in the civil rather than the international dimensions of the conflicts in which those governments have been involved is a fact neatly glossed over.

The Namibian issue is one which for several years has been considered close to a resolution. It is sometimes cited as an issue on which effective Soviet-American cooperation could be especially constructive, perhaps initiating a progression of further cooperative steps. One Soviet official close to the problem argued, however, that a final resolution of the Namibian problem depends entirely on the United States. He suggested that the Reagan administration was the only participant in the negotiations insisting upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as part of an overall settlement. That condition, he argued, went beyond the terms of U.N. Resolution 435—the originally-agreed basis for a settlement—and constituted a regression from the position of the Carter administration. This official also expressed the view that Cuban troops would leave Angola as soon as the need for them was removed—namely, as soon as the South African threat has been eliminated, a situation which would result from Namibian independence.

The Soviets clearly intend to try to isolate the United States on this issue and seek to use the delay in reaching a settlement to highlight the U.S. association with South Africa. They continue to find their interests best served by simultaneously advocating Namibian independence, rejecting "linkage" and claiming that the question of Cuban troops is a matter to be worked out with the Angolans rather than themselves.

Therefore, instead of an area for positive movement, Africa remains a point of United States-Soviet friction, and in the case of

Namibia, a major disappointment to our African friends and European allies.

Middle East

The Soviets have clearly felt "left out" of the negotiations for an Arab-Israeli settlement and resent the obvious American efforts to exclude them from what they consider to be their rightful role as a superpower. They have tried hard to derail the Camp David process and to force the United States back into a broader framework of regional negotiations in which they can play a central role. They argue with seeming confidence that a long-term settlement in the area can only be achieved with their support and influence upon key Arab and Palestinian players.

The Soviets acknowledge that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was, in the short run, a major shift in the regional correlation of forces against them. What is not readily admitted, however, is that the invasion and occupation not only represented a decisive military victory over their Palestinian and Syrian allies, but also constituted a serious embarrassment to the Soviets themselves in demonstrating the limits of their commitments. It also revealed the limitations of some of their military hardware in the face of a skillful army and air force equipped with some of the latest Western technology. The fact that the Soviets have now responded by stationing some of their finest SAM (SA-5) defenses in Syria and, even more ominously, accompanied them with Soviet operating personnel, indicates the seriousness with which they view their position in the area. During our visit to Moscow, the Soviets issued a strongly worded statement conveying this message.

The Soviet position in the area is especially precarious because Syria, its closest ally, is an opportunistic one. Other radical Arab states also have mixed feelings about the benefits of Soviet support, while periodic Soviet efforts to cultivate conservative Arab states have thus far not been very successful.

The Soviets argue that in the long run, the Israeli invasion will prove to be a strategic setback for the United States. By reinforcing Israeli intransigence on the question of a Palestinian homeland, and demonstrating the unwillingness of the United States to restrain or pressure the Begin government, Soviet analysts suggest that the United States is now inextricably implicated in the "militarist and expansionist" policies of the Israeli Government. That implication will make it impossible for the United States to play the role of middleman or guarantor of a settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, they claim, and ultimately, the only feasible settlement will be a political resolution in which the Soviet Union itself is involved.

Southwest Asia

Afghanistan has become a costly, long-term problem for the Soviets, but one which they seem prepared to endure for the foreseeable future. Certainly if they were able to secure satisfactory terms for the withdrawal of their forces from the country, they would be eager to do so. But as yet, the Soviet Government seems unprepared to accept anything but an overtly pro-Soviet regime in Kabul

protected by explicit commitments from outside powers to end all support for the Afghan resistance.

The staff was in Moscow during the visit of U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, who was exploring the possibility of a negotiated settlement. At his press conference, the Secretary-General insisted that the Soviets had not presented a set of preconditions for such a settlement and that all possibilities would continue to be pursued. The Soviets certainly have nothing to lose by participating in such discussions; in fact, negotiations under United Nations auspices involving other governments lends a certain credence to their claim that the Afghan insurgency would not survive without the intervention of other countries.

While responsible government officials did not go beyond well known official positions, certain institute specialists were willing to speculate about possible adjustments which might be made in the resolution of the Soviet's Afghan problem. They suggested that the situation was "not stable" and that the "temperature" was actually going down. They also referred to negotiations between the Karmal government and various "religious leaders" designed to broaden the base of the government and accommodate concerns of the traditional leadership for religious freedom and political autonomy. Finally, these experts also mentioned the possibility of regional pull-backs by Soviet forces within Afghanistan as part of a military accommodation with various regional leaders.

Despite such speculations, the Soviet Government gives little evidence of impatience or of a willingness to consider a less-than-satisfactory outcome in the near term. Both in its prosecution of the war and its overt commitment to the Karmal government, the Soviet Union seems determined to pursue its original course aimed at controlling the country by force before any long-term arrangement involving the withdrawal of Soviet forces is accepted.

The Iran-Iraq war was also a subject of discussion with certain academic specialists, who argued that the United States gains from the continuation of that conflict in two ways. First, the war encourages divisions within the Arab world which can be exploited; second, it provides an excuse for the presence of the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, these experts suggested, the Soviet Union gains nothing from this fight, although it cannot bring it to an end. Initial Soviet concerns that the war would force them to choose between Iraq and Iran have subsided with the stalemate in the fighting itself; they have been able to maintain regular, if uneasy, relations with both belligerents.

Southeast Asia

Discussions with Soviet officials and analysts on the question of Kampuchea and of Vietnam's role in Southeast Asia were generally unproductive. The Soviets argue that Vietnam is a sovereign government pursing its own interests without instructions or even encouragement from Moscow. Furthermore, the suggestion that poison gas or biological toxin agents have been used by Vietnamese forces in Laos and Kampuchea is scoffed at as Western propaganda.

The Soviets seem serious about improving relations with the ASEAN countries and of convincing them that they must make ac-

commodations to the strength and influence of Vietnam. On recent occasions, however, certain high Soviet officials have also warned of the potential for insurgencies against the established governments themselves if they should fail to be more forthcoming. Such none-too-subtle threats will probably be counterproductive with the countries involved and further deepen their suspicions of the Vietnamese.

East Asia

The Soviet view of the recent thaw in Sino-Soviet relations might be described as one of cautious self-satisfaction. The recent diplomatic discussions at the Deputy Foreign Minister level are regarded as the result of an important moderation of Chinese policy toward the U.S.S.R., and therefore a vindication of their patient determination in the past to give no ground on broader questions or other matters. While the Chinese have continued to insist upon the necessity for progress on the border issues and on Afghanistan and Kampuchea, they apparently have recently been willing to proceed without insisting upon such progress as preconditions for a general improvement of relations. Trade is expected to increase substantially—albeit from a very low level—and certain modest steps to reduce border tensions are also anticipated.

When asked to account for this adjustment in the Chinese attitude, Soviet specialists emphasize primarily the domestic factors which have led to a greater pragmatism in Chinese foreign policy and a determination among the leadership to concentrate upon economic development. The passage of Mao Zedong and his Cultural Revolutionary heirs, the "Gang of Four," is the principal explanation cited for this change of heart. Chinese disillusionment with the course of Sino-American relations is mentioned as only one factor among many. However, the Soviets also emphasize that they would prefer normal relations between China and both the United States and the Soviet Union. They are not seeking, they say, to gain leverage or advantages in United States-Soviet relations by "playing a China card." Several Soviet officials during our visit emphasized that "the Soviet Union does not play cards in international relations.

Furthermore, the Soviets say they do not view America's "China card" as having had much influence upon them. Whatever their initial fears may have been on this score, they do not profess concern about a closer military relationship between the United States and China. When asked about their likely reaction to the transfer of militarily-significant technology to China, one Soviet analyst suggested that the Soviet Union would be protected on such matters by the realities of American politics.

The idea of arms control discussions with the Chinese is not one that Soviet officials were willing to discuss even in hypothetical terms, presumably because they do not wish to lend support for the American position on the need for "global" limitations on the Soviet SS–20 missile.

The Soviets concede that they cannot confidently rely upon a Chinese willingness to normalize relations beyond the initial steps already expected. They maintain that matters relating to Afghanistan and Kampuchea are "third-country" issues whose resolution is

not appropriate for compromise merely out of a desire to improve Sino-Soviet relations. The volatility of Chinese politics and the possibility of a return to more ideological, less pragmatic leadership are also considerations in looking at the long-term development of relations.

On the subject of Japan, Soviet officials and analysts convey a stern warning to the United States. The rearmament of Japan and the growth of an activist defense policy there, they say, is a short-sighted and dangerous course being pursued by the United States which we will one day regret. Once awakened, the direction of "Japanese militarism" cannot easily be controlled. Of course, the Soviets do not accept the argument that their own activities in the Far East have created justifiable concerns in Japan or the United States.

E. Multilateral Issues

The staff raised a series of multilateral issues with a high-ranking legal official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

International Law

This official began by contrasting the principal approach and scrupulous regard for international law which he said characterized Soviet foreign policy with the general "legal negativism" currently ascribed to the United States. He accused the United States of resisting and undercutting efforts to promote the development of international law in general and of violating certain of its international legal obligations. He singled out the U.S. refusal to sign the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention in December and the March 10 Presidential Declaration of an Exclusive Economic Zone as "proof" that the United States "intends to ignore the position of the overwhelming majority of states" on LOS matters.

The official also said that the United States "shows a lack of respect" for international law in such areas as noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, arms control, and the 1980 "Moon Treaty" as well as the law of the sea. The United States, he said, not only failed to follow through on its obligations to ratify the SALT II Treaty and the LOS Convention, but also failed to live up to its obligations under various bilateral agreements with the U.S.S.R., mentioning specifically those relating to Aeroflot flights, port calls for ships, and cultural exchanges. He said that such actions reflect a general deterioration in U.S. attitudes toward international cooperation. However, this official was not prepared to cite particular provisions which had clearly been violated by the United States.

Human Rights

This official's answers to human rights questions underscore the Soviet view that these are internal matters only and illustrate the "debating school" approach which most Soviets adopt in discussing human rights and issues with foreigners. He insisted that the Soviet Union fulfills its obligations under "Basket Three" of the Helsinki Final Act within the limits of "existing national norms and administrative rules." He pointed out that in the past the

United States prohibited its citizens from travelling to Cuba, and yet we criticize the Soviet Union for limiting the travel rights of its citizens. He argued that Andrei Sakharov's internal exile to Gorkiy did not compare with the "atrocities committed by the Israelis" in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. This official also attacked current efforts by the United States to increase its defense budget as a violation of human rights because funds would have to be diverted from social welfare programs. (He said he had personally witnessed the effects of reduced social spending by observing the derelicts in New York's Central Park!)

When asked why the Soviet Union does not tolerate private human rights organizations, the official replied that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. operate under different systems. "We don't like each other," he added, "but we must respect the rules of peaceful coexistence; that is, we don't export revolution to the United States, and you shouldn't export counterrevolution to the Soviet Union."

He criticized President Reagan's "crusade against communism" for not corresponding to the principle of peaceful coexistence which he described as "one of the basic principles of modern international law." He evaded a question as to whether the Soviets viewed this "negative" U.S. attitude as predating the Reagan Administration by saying that the date of the change in American attitudes was not important. What was important, he stressed, was the trend away from détente toward confrontation. He referred to the emphasis on human rights by the United States as demogoguery and a "tool of psychological warfare." He asked why the United States had not ratified the genocide and human rights covenants which provide "objective" standards of behavior, and instead proposed only "subjective" institutions such as an international human rights commissioner.

United Nations

The United States, according to this official, is becoming increasingly isolated in the United Nations. It opposes many useful initiatives and is positively arrogant toward some proposals. He said that the United States violates both the spirit and the letter of the U.N. Charter involving the "threat or use of force" and seeks military advantages in order to "dictate" to the other countries. He said that U.S. preparations to fight a nuclear war were a "gross violation" of international law.

Antarctica

This Soviet official, who has been close to the recent Antarctic negotiations, praised the 1959 Antarctic Treaty as "one of the rare areas where cooperation still exists between the United States and the Soviet Union" and noted that the treaty had been a U.S. initiative. He stressed that it is the objective of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to preserve the basic provisions of the Antarctic Treaty regime, in particular, the special role of the consultative parties and principle of consensus. He did not appear overly concerned about the suggestion by some developing countries that Antarctica should be treated as a part of "the common heritage of mankind," so long as the sanctity of the existing consensus principle is maintained.

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